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RIGHT OF AN AGGRESSOR IN AN ASSAULT TO COvPENSATION
Introduction
Since the appearance of the Workmen's Compensation acts in
our statutory law, the courts have been troubled with the problem
of just how far they should go in concluding that a particular in-
jury arose "out of and in the course of employment," the statutory
language which is made the sole condition precedent to an award
of compensation under the great majority of state and federal
statutes.' Although it was early recognized that the statutes were
enacted to eliminate the harsh common law defenses available to
an employer when one of his employees sought to recover for an
injury suffered in the course of his work,2 the courts were not
prone to grant an award where it was determined that the injured
employee was at fault in some degree. It was very difficult for
judges who had been schooled in the common law to impose liabil-
ity without fault, despite the fact that they were specifically au-
thorized to do so by statute.
With the passage of time and the increasing number of industrial
accidents due in part to the rapid growth of American industry,
the courts became more familiar with the underlying purpose of
the Workmen's Compensation acts, which was to prevent injured
workers from becoming public charges,3 and began to interpret
the acts so as to effectuate this purpose. The scope of this survey
will be confined to a determination of just how far the courts have
proceeded in finding that an injury suffered by an aggressor in an
assault is an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
Early Developments
In the early cases dealing with assaults, it was stipulated that
the only factor which would serve to relieve the employer from
liability for resultant injuries would be that the injured employee
1 Statutory provisions 'are summarized in 1 LARsox, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 6.10 (1952).
2 The three main defenses were: (1) the fellow-servant rule, (2) con-
tributory negligence, and (3) assumption of risk. See discussion in Horovitz,
The Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of" Employment, 3 NACCA L. J. 15, 19
(1949).
3 See 1 ScHNEmER, WonmAts's COMPENSATION § 1 (2d ed. 1932).
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was the aggressor in the affray.4 There seemed to exist, however,
a great deal of uncertainty as to just what was sufficient to render
a person an aggressor. When a subordinate employee called his
foreman a liar, this was held to have precipitated the a~saut on
the employee and was the basis for denying an award for the em-
ployee's resulting injuries.5 In the converse situation, where the
foreman used the abusive language and the employee struck the
first blow, it was held that the injury caused by the retaliatory
blow of the foreman was coinpensable.6 Also, where two employees
engaged in a quarrel over their duties and the injured party used
strong language, his injury caused by the other employee's blow
was held not to be compensable.7 The reasoning of these decisions
appears to be that the use of abusive language supports an ensuing
assault, and the speaker of such language is thereby rendered the
aggressor in a subsequent affray so as to preclude compensation
for any injuries received as a result thereof. The better view would.
seem to be that a quarrel arising out of the work being done by two
employees, resulting in an injury to one of them, should be re-
garded as bringing such injury within the coverage of the act.a
In any event, mere strong or abusive language should never ren-
der the user thereof the aggressor in a subsequent fight,9 nor should
it warrant an assault by the injured employee. 0
Where the assault is provoked by personal motives unrelated
to the employment, the courts have had little difficulty in finding
that an injury suffered by the aggressor has not arisen out of and
in the course of employment.:" This is rightly so. The Workmen's
Compensation acts were obviously not intended to render every
injury suffered by an employee while at work compensable. There
must be some connection between the injury and the conditions
of employment. It must appear affirmatively that, but for the
employment, the conditions giving rise to the injury would not
4 Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Jordan, 140 Okla. 238, 283 Pac. 240, 241
(1929).
5 Knocks v. Metal Package Corp., 194 App. Div. 65, 185 N.Y. Supp. 309
(3d Dep't 1920).
6 Meucci v. Gallatin Coal Co., 279 Pa. 184, 123 AtI. 766 (1924). The
court here did not discuss the aggressor defense, basing its award on the
fact that the injury-producing quarrel occurred in the course of employment.
7 Kimbro v. Black & White Cab Cb., 50 Ga. App. 143, 177 SE. 274 (1934).
S Fey v. Bobrink, 84 Ind. App. 559, 151 N.E. 705, 706 (1926).
9 Levy v. World-Telegram, 255 App. Div. 237, 7 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (3d
Dep't 1938).
10 Davis v. Robinson, 94 Ind. App. 104, 179 N.E. 797, 799 (1932).
11 Williams v. Industrial Comm'n, 63 Ohio App. 66, 25 NE.2d 313, 315
(1939); McDevitt v. Checker Cab Co., 288 Pa. 394, 136 Atl. 230, 231 (1927);
Wilkerson v. Industrial Com n'n, 71 Utah 355, 266 Pac. 270, 271 (1928).
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have arisen1 2 The mere fact that the injury occurs on the em-
ployer's premises during working hours does not render it com-
pensable. The traditional view has been that there must be a
causal connection between the nature of the employment and the
injury. Thus where an employee assaults another employee be-
cause of a purely personal matter, the causal connection is
broken, and the resultant injury to the instigator is not covered
by the act. In such cases there is no need to determine who
struck the first blow and thereby became the aggressor.
In the early stages of the present problem some of the courts
distinguished between assaults instigated to protect some interest
of the employer and those started to -protect some personal inter-
est. An injury suffered by the instigator in the former class was
held to be covered by the act,13 while an injury suffered by the
initiator in the latter class was not.' 4 In Scott v. Travelers' Ins.
Co.,15 wherein recovery was allowed, the court was of the opinion
that the aggressor should not be denied compensation in every
case of assault. There are instances where an employee is required
by the very nature of his employment to protect his employer's
property from damage and in some cases from trespasses. The na-
ture of the employee's duties in such circumstances would often
necessitate the use of force, and this would technically make him
the aggressor in a resulting affray. However, this should by no
means take that employee out of the coverage of the act.'6 This is
basic, since the act specifically covers injuries arising out of and
in the course of one's employment, and in such a case as this, the
instigating of an assault may well be part of a person's employment.
In spite of this seemingly sound reasoning, some courts have still
refused compensation to an aggressor even when he was protect-
ing his employer's interests in starting the fight.17 The basis for
such a decision appears to be that the injury results not from a
risk incidental to the employment but rather from the injured
employee's rashness in using such methods to further his employ-
er's interests. The soundness of this reasoning is questionable. It
has also been held that if an employee uses unlawful means to fur-
ther his employer's business, a resulting injury is not compen-
12 Winter v. United States Gypsum Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 425, 28 A.2d 545,
547 (Workmen's Comp. Bureau, Dep't Labor 1942).
3 Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629, 636 (1934).
'4 Plouffe v. American Hard Rubber Co., 211 App. Div. 298, 207 N.Y.
Supp. 373 (3d Dep't 1925).
15 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.F_ 629 (1934)..
36 Id., 174 S.E. at 633-36.
11 Triangle Auto Painting & Trimming Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 346
Ill. 609, 178 N.E. 886, 889 (1931).
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sable.'8
The aggressor defense was applied in various ways in the early
cases in which it arose, but almost all such cases led to the same
conclusion; the courts simply would not allow an employee who
started a fight to recover compensation for a resultant injury. It
has been held that, in initiating the affray, the injured employee
had left his status as an employee and had become a common
criminal.' " This basis for denying an award must be limited to
special situations, for not every act of aggression amounts to such
a serious crime as to take an employee out of his status as such.
A more rational application of the aggressor defense is made in
those cases where the court merely determines that the injury suf-
fered by the employee who instigated the affray is not an accident
arising out of his employment within the meaning of the act.20
Injuries received by an aggressor have been analogized to injuries
received as the result of horseplay and skylarking, in which cases
compensation was originally denied,21 although now generally al-
lowed22.
A number of the Workmen's Compensation acts contain specific
provisions to the effect that injuries received as a result of a wilful
intention to injure another are not compensable.a2 Some statutes
require that there be an attempt to injure another.24 The only
question to be determined in these states is whether the injury
suffered was a result of the employee's wilful intention, or at-
tempt, to injure another. Where the word "wilful" is used in the
Is Wooley v. Minneapolis Equipment Co., 157 Mim. 428, 196 N.W. 477
(1923). This decision, however, must be confined to its facts, since it is
apparent that the fatally injured employee was no longer furthering his
employer's business when he accosted the stranger on the street.
'9 Griffin v. A. Roberson & Son, 176 App. Div. 6, 162 N.Y. Supp. 313, 315
(3d Dep't 1916); McDevitt v. Checker Cab Co., 288 Pa. 394, 136 Atl. 230, 231
(1927); Curran v. Vang Constr. Co., 286 Pa. 245, 133 Atl. 261 (1926).
20 Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Haynie, 43 Ga. App. 579, 159 S.E. 781
(1931).
23 Such cases are discussed in Merkel v. T. A. Gillespie Co., 10 N.J. Misc.
1081, 162 Ati. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
22 See Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws, 41 ILL. L. RE. 311, 324 (1946).
23 ALASKA COUP. LAWS ANN. § 43-3-7 (1949); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1305
(Supp. 1953); FLA. STAT. § 440.09 (3) (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-202 (1949);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1081 (1950); =a. REv.
STAT. c.31, § 18 (1954); mISS. CODE Am. § 6998-04 (1952); iNEv. com'. LAWS §
2681 (1929); N.Y. WOmme'S comnP. LAW § 10; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1950);
Nx. REV. CODE § 65-0102 (8) (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 11 (1951); r4i GEN.
LAWS, c.300 art.f- § 2 (1938); s.c. CODE § 72-156 (1952); TEX. STAT. REV. CIV. art.
8309 § 1 (1925); vT. REV. STAT. § 8103 (1947).
24 GA. CODE ANN. § 114-105 (1937); VA. CODE § 65-35 (1950).
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statute it should be interpreted to require an element of deliberate-
ness in the aggressor's act. In other words, the term should be
limited to situations where the aggressor attacks another employee
with the deliberate intention of inflicting harm on the latter. A
blow struck in a heated argument which arises out of the work
of two employees would not in itself evidence a wilful intention
to injure another in this sense. In many such instances there is no
intention whatsoever, the blow merely being the culmination of
a heated verbal battle. It is apparent that the state of mind
of the aggressor at the time he hit the other employee is difficult
to determine; however, the subsequent acts of the aggressor will
in many cases indicate what his intention was in striking the first
blow. If it becomes necessary for the victim to slay his assailant
or inflict serious bodily harm in order to protect himself from fur-
ther injury, this would seem to evince a wilful or deliberate in-
tention on the part of the assailant to injure his victim. This is the
type of case in which the injury suffered by the assailant is rightly
held not to be compensable under the statutes precluding "wilful"
aggressors from recovery.
An uneffected threat should never be considered as a wilful in-
tention to injure a fellow employee.25 The burden is on the em-
ployer to show that the injured employee suffered his injury as a
result of his wilful intention to injure another. Thus, where it is
affirmatively shown that the deceased employee was killed in self-
defense as a result of his attack on a fellow employee, compensation
is rightly denied.
2 6
Even where the claimant was not the aggressor but was the
other employee whoin the aggressor attacked, the injury received
by the claimant was held not to be compensable because the sub-
sequent assault on the technical aggressor was viscious and evi-
denced a wilful intention to injure another.27 Also, where an em-
ployee was instructed by his employer to carry a gun and he shot
a striker who was coming after him evidently to cause injury, the
ensuing death of the employee was held not to be an accident aris-
ing out of the employment within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation act. Although the deceased employee was apparent-
ly acting in self-defense, the court felt that he used excessive
force in repelling his attacker.25
25 Keyhea v. Woodard-Walker Lumber Co., 147 So. 830, 833 (La. App.
1933). But see Garrett v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co., 19 La. App. 858, 141
So. 809 (1932).
26 Pierson v. Sterling Sugars, Inc., 149 So. 903 (La. App. 1933).
27 Stein v. Williams Printing Co., 195 App. Div. 336, 186 N.Y. Supp. 705
(3d Dep't 1921).
28 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 56 Ga. App. 68, 192 S.E. 325 (1937).
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Toward the end of the nineteen thirties, the courts were already
talking in terms of disregarding the technical distinction as to who
was the aggressor in an assault. So long as the altercation arose
.from the work of the participants, any injury caused thereby was
an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and hence
was compensable. 9 In a work-connected assault, the fact that the
injured employee threw the first punch should not preclude an
award of compensation. Although not dealing expressly with the
problem, one court indicated that the aggressor defense would no
longer be conclusive under the Workmen's Compensation act.3 0 If
a court should determine that the aggressor defense is conclusive,
it would then be faced with the very difficult problem of defining
just what an aggressor is and what acts amount to aggression.3 '
It is apparent from the foregoing cases that no universal standard
could be formulated. This would mean that it would be up to the
court to decide in each set of circumstances whether, in its opinion,
the injured employee was the aggressor. The unfavorable results
from such a procedure are quite evident from the complete lack
of uniformity in the decisions discussed above. The only sound
solution would be to abolish the aggressor defense in work-con-
nected assault cases. The modern trend is in this direction.
Modern Trend
The turning point of the outlook of the courts on the defense of
aggression can probably be attributed to the discussion of the
problem in the case of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v.
Cardillo.3 2 This was a proceeding under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.3 3 The court expressly found
that the injured employee was not the aggressor in the assault,
but it went on to discuss the aggressor defense at length. The Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act contains a provision similar
to many of the state acts34 to the effect that no injury is compen-
sable which is caused by the employee's wilful intention to injure
another. The court refused to read the aggressor defense into this
part of the act and, in interpreting this provision, said: 35
29 Schueller v. Armour & Co., 116 Pa. 323, 176 Atl. 527, 529 (1935).
30 Stulginski v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355, 199 Atl.
653, 658 (1938).
31 Ibid.
32 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
33 44 STAT. "1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1946). This is the federal coun-
terpart of the state Workmen's Compensation acts. It was made applicable
to the District of Columbia in 1928. 45 STAT. 600 (192).
34 See note 23, supra.
35 U2 F.2d at 17.
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This provision, reinforced by the statutory presumptions and
the Act's fundamental policy in departing from fault as the basis
of liability and of defense, except as specified, is inconsistent with
any notion that recovery is barred by misconduct which amounts
to no more than temporary lapse from duty, conduct immediately
irrelevant to the job, contributory negligence, fault, illegality, etc.,
unless it amounts to the kind and degree of misconduct prescribed
in definite terms by the Act. It is entirely inconsistent with reading
into the statute the law of tort causation and defense, where
liability is predicated on fault and nullified by contributory fault.
The court emphasized the fact that the act was passed to do
away with the common law notions of liability and defense. If the
aggressor defense were to be adhered to this would bring back one
of the common law defenses which such acts were meant to abro-
gate.
The full effect of this decision, unfortunately, was not to be felt
in the state courts until almost ten years later. In the meantime the
courts continued to engage in judicial legislation by denying
awards of compensation where it was found that the injured em-
ployee had been the instigator of the altercation.
38
There was still little difficulty in determining that an injury suf-
fered by an aggressor did not arise out of or in the course of his
employment where the assault was instigated solely for the per-
sonal motive of the aggressor. The reasoning of the court in one
case3 7 attempts to justify the conclusion that, unless the employee
is required by the duties of his employment to use force, any in-
jury suffered as a result of his use of force arises out of a purely
personal matter and is not compensable. This seems inherently
unsound and shows the inability of some courts to realize that in
the majority of these cases the assault is directly, attributable to
the working environment. Whether an employee is protecting an
interest of his employer, or enforcing some rule of his employer,
should only be considered as one of the factors in determining
whether the resulting injury was caused by the working condi-
tions of the injured employee. To say that every assault which is
not required by one's duties, or is not engaged in for the interest
of the employer, is the emanation of a purely personal motive is
to misconceive the entire problem. It is the work which brings the
combatants together; it is the work which in most cases gives rise
to a verbal dispute resulting in an affray wherein one employee
is injured. It seems entirely illogical and unreasonable to say
36 Horvath v. La Fond, 305 Mich. 69, 8 N.W.2d 915 (1943); Brown v.
Philmac Sportswear Co., 23 N.J. Misc. 378, 44 A.2d 805 (Workmen's Comp.
Bureau, Dep't Labor 1945).
37 Jackson v. State Compensation Comm'r, 127 W.Va. 59, 31 S.E.2d 848
(1944).
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that if the injured employee is the one who landed the first punch
he cannot recover, whereas if the injured employee was the re-
cipient of the first blow he can recover. The first blow may do
little or no damage, yet this precludes the initiator thereof from
any form of relief if the victim retaliates and inflicts a severe in-
jury on the technical aggressor. There is nothing in the acts
which requires such a result.
Of course, it is not disputed that if the quarrel is over a purely
personal matter,38 or if the injured employee has stepped outside
of his employment in engaging in a quarrel,3 9 compensation is
rightly denied for any resulting injury.
The courts are still in conflict as to whether strong language
makes an employee an aggressor in a subsequent fracas, and
whether such language warrants an assault by an employee who
is injured as a result thereof. It was held that an injury received
by a worker who provoked an assault by the use of abusive
language coupled with threatening gestures was not the result
of an accident arising out of the employment.40 In making such a
decision it is apparent that the court reverted to the common law
theory of contributing fault, one of the main defenses that the
acts were intended to abolish. In a better reasoned case,41 an
award was granted where the injured employee used insulting
and abusive language thereby causing a fellow worker to assault
him; the court specifically held that the use of such language was
not sufficient to make the speaker the aggressor in the resulting
assault.
The courts of the states which have specific provisions preclud-
ing compensation for an injury caused by a wilful intention to
injure another 42 are still reading the aggressor defense into
these provisions. A claimant who was impliedly accused of theft
by a fellow employee, and who thereupon struck his accuser,
38 Monte v. General Motors Corp., 24 N.J. Misc. 383, 49 A2d 591 (C.P.
1946).
39 Armour & Co. v. Industrial Conm'n, 397 IMI. 433, 74 N.E2d 704 (1947);
Vollmer v. Milwaukee, 254 Wis. 162, 35 N.W.2d 304 (1948).
40 Lindsay v. Hoffman Beverage Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 356, 19 A.2d 824, 827
(Workmen's Comp. Bureau, Dep't Labor 1941). See also, Container Corp.
of America v. Industrial Comm'n, 401 IM. 129, 81 N.E2d 571 (1948), wherein
recovery was disallowed because prior threat of deceased employee to cut
another employee's throat was considered sufficient to make the speaker
thereof the aggressor.
41 York v. City of Hazard, 301 Ky. 306, 191 S.W.2d 239 (1945); accord,
Conley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 So. 2d 681 (La. 1951); Stephens v. Spuck
Iron & Foundry Co., 358 Mo. 372, 214 S.W.2d 534 (1948); Gerard v. American
Can Co., 32 N.J. Super. 310, 108 A.2d 293 (App. Div. 1954).
42 See note 23, supra.
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was denied recovery for injury received from the accuser's re-
taliatory blow. The fact that the claimant struck the first blow
brought him within the exception set out in the act.4 3 The court
recognized the fact that certain words may be of such a provoca-
tive character as to justify an assault if they were spoken under
the circumstances that would create an expectancy of physical
retaliation; but it was held that an accusation of theft by impli-
cation was not in this class of words.
Under the provisions of the statutes referred to in the pre-
ceding paragraph, whether the injured employee was the ag-
gressor is held to be a question of fact. If it be determined that
he was the aggressor it becomes unnecessary to decide whether he
was injured in the course of his employment.4 It is submitted
that this is a wrong interpretation of this statutory exception.
Nowhere in these statutes can be found the specific defense of
"aggression." Had the framers wished to include this in the ex-
ception provisions, it seems they would have done so in express
terms. Not every act of aggression can be justly classified as evi-
dence of a wilful intention to injure another. To so hold is to mis-
interpret the act, and to disregard its remedial nature.
The Texas act provides that an injury within the meaning of
the act shall not include an injury caused by the employee's wil-
ful intention to injure an6ther.45 In determining whether an as-
sault is unlawful within the meaning of the act, the courts look
to the penal code.4 6 Two other courts, although not directly con-
cerned with the question, have indicated qifite clearly that the
aggressor defense would still be followed in their respective
states.
47
The first case in which the aggressor defense was fully consid-
ered and unqualifiedly discarded was the case of Newell v. Mor-
eau.48 The court discussed the question of whether assaults and
their resultant injuries were accidental and concluded that since
such events were sudden and unexpected they were truly acci-
dental. Compensable injuries caused by assaults were expressly
43 Gross v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837 (La. 1946).
44 Burkhardt v. City of Monroe, 37 So. 2d 601 (La. 1948).
45 TEX. STAT. PEW. civ., art. 8309, §1 (1925).
46 Federal Underwriters Exchange v Samuel, 138 Tex. 444, 160 S.W.2d 61,
64 (1942).
47 Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 18 So. 2d
251, 254 (1944); Staten v. Long-Turner Constr. Co., 185 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Mo.
1945).
48 94 N.H. 439, 55 A2d 476 (1947). The defense had previously been dis-
carded in Haas v. Brotherhood of Transportation Workers, 158 Pa. Super.
291, 44 A.2d 776 (1945), but it seems the court meant to confine the holding
to situations such as that presented to it by that case.
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limited to work-connected assaults and rightly so. The act in
this state provided that injuries received as a result of serious or
wilful misconduct were not compensable; a simple assault or bat-
tery was held not to amount to such unlawful conduct. As to the
discarding of the aggressor defense, the court stated: 
49
The defense of "aggression" is not to be found in our statute or
in other compensation laws. By the application of tort reasoning
the defense has been judicially inserted in some compensation cases.
We have already refused to read in a similar defense in sportive
assaults ... and we see no reason for its judicial insertion in this
assault.
The court concluded by stating that it was basing its decision
partly on the reasoning of the case of Hartford Accident and In-
demnity Co. v. Cardillo.50
Thus the state courts were beginning to take cognizance of the
sound reasoning put forward by the court in the Hartford case
for abolishing the aggressor defense. For these courts, the fact
that the claimant strikes the first blow is no longer the only test
as to whether his injury comes within the purview of the act.5 1
So long as the assault arises out of the nature and conditions of
the employment, and the injured employee's action does not
amount to serious and wilful misconduct, relief will be granted.
Of course if the assault is purely personal no relief is accorded.
5 2
The relation of the employment to the injury must be that of
"cause to effect." 53 If this relation is established it is not neces-
sary to determine which employee threw the first punch. The
act provides for relief where the injury arises out of the employ-
ment; thus, where this is shown, the fact that the injured em-
ployee commenced the altercation will not serve to bar him from
his statutory right to compensation.
The position hitherto taken by the New York courts has been
completely discarded as the result of a recent case.54 Although
the New York Workmen's Compensation Act contains a pro-
vision that no compensation will be allowed for an injury occa-
sioned by the employee's wilful intention to injure another,55
49 55 A.2d at 479-80.
50 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940), discussed
supra.
51 Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E2d 69, 71-72 (1949).
52 Willis v. Taylor & Fenn Co., 137 Conn. 626, 79 A.2d 821 (1951); Roth-
farb v. Camp Awanee, Inc., 116 Vt. 172, 71 A.2d 569 (1950).
53 Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1949).
54 Commissioner v. Bronx Hospital, 276 App. Div. 708, 97 N.Y.S.2d 120
(3d Dep't 1950).
' N.Y. WORIIEN'S COMP. LAW § 10.
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the court recognized that this provision does not include the
aggressor defense, whether the aggression be in cases of horse-
play or malicious assaults. If the assault is work-connected it
becomes immaterial whether the injured employee is regarded
as the instigator of the dispute or as the innocent victim thereof.
The act does not incorporate the theory that those at fault should
not be awarded any relief and the courts are not justified in
reading such a defense into the act. The court made its position
very clear when it stated: 56
The victim of work-inducted assults should be given compensa-
tion rights, without importing narrow common law rules barring
an aggressor, and without indulging in mental gymnastics to
determine who struck the first blow. Using the word "aggressor"
as a defense to an award is to bring back into the compensation law
common law defenses which have been outlawed.
This position was reaffirmed in a later case, wherein it was con-
tended that the claimant was the aggressor. 57 The court upheld
the award on the basis that the issue of fact whether the injury
was sustained in the course of and arising out of the employment
was determined in favor of the claimant and was supported by
sufficient evidence.58
Regardless of the trend in the opposite direction, the courts of
Louisiana, which has a statutory provision similar to that of New
York, still continue to read the aggressor defense into the com-
pensation act.59 Illinois refuses an award where the injured em-
ployee is found to be the aggressor on the ground that the injury
risk in such a case is not incidental to the employment but is
directly attributable to the employee's act of aggression.60 In
two recent New Jersey cases6 1 although the court specifically
found that the injured employee was not the aggressor, it was
indicated that had he been, he would have been barred from any
relief.
Notwithstanding these repeated conflicts in the cases, the ma-
56 Commissioner v. Bronx Hospital, 276 App. Div. 708, 97 N.Ys2d 120,
122-23 (3d Dep't 1950).
57 Young v. Famous Trading Corp., 283 App. Div. 753, 128 N.Y.S.2d 163
(3d Dep't 1954), aff'd, 123 N.E2d 254 (1954).
58 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the employer also contended the
claimant had quit his job and then returned to the employer's premises to
engage in the affray.
59 Jenkins v. Cities Service Refining Corp., 44 So. 2d 719 (La. 1950).
60 Fischer v. Industrial Comm'n, 408 111. 115, 96 N.E2d 478 (1951).
61 Cierpial v. Ford Motor Co., 16 N.J. 561, 109 A2d 666, 668 (1954); Aug-
elli v. Rolans Credit Clothing Store, 33 N.J. Super. 146, 109 A.2d 439, 441
(1954). In the latter case it was necessary for the court to reverse a finding
of the director that the blowing of a horn was an act of aggression!
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jority of the courts which have been presented with the issue in
recent years have abolished the previously followed aggressor
defense or have refused to adopt it. One court dfsposed of this
defense by stating that the act was intended to impose liability on
the employer for injuries suffered in the course of employment
regardless of fault. Thus the charge of aggression could not be a
defense since it amounts to little more than a claim that the in-
jured employee was at fault.6 2 The court went a little further in
its attempt to discard the aggressor defense in compensation
cases. It analogized a work-connected assault, where the aggres-
sor is injured and seeks an award under the act, to the respondeat
superior cases where an employee assaults a third party during a
dispute arising out of the work.6 3 In the latter case it is held
that the employee is acting within the scope of his employment
when committing the assault; 64 therefore it seems to follow that
an injury received while committing the assault is an injury aris-
ing in the course of employment and is compensable. The court
concluded its opinion by stating: 
6 5
There is no basis for distinguishing between the case where the
employee initiated the assault and where he did not or that of an
aggressor and non-aggressor, except in one the employee is at fault
and in the other he is not. As seen, this cannot be valid distinction,
because the fault of the employee is no bar to recovery ...
The Nebraska courts indicate that the aggressor defense is no
longer available in compensation cases.66 The first time a Min-
nesota court was faced with the question of whether an aggressor
in a work-connected altercation could recover compensation for
injuries suffered, it decided the issue in favor of the aggressor.
67
The court believed that it would not be a reasonable distinction
to say that an injury suffered by a victim of an assault arose out
of the employment and that an injury suffered by the aggressor
did not so arise. The Minnesota act does not provide that an act
of aggression bars relief and it would be an usurpation of the
legislative function for the court to read such a defense into the
statute. The court, to support its decision, fell back on the time-
honored principle, relied on so often in interpreting statutes, that
it is up to the legislature to say whether cotributory fault shall
62 State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 38 Cal. 2d
659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952).
63 Id. 242 P.2d at 313.
64 Carr v. Win. C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5, 6 (1946).
65 242 P.2d at 318.
66 Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., 155 Neb. 714,53 N.W.2d 203, 208 (1952).




The Arkansas statute contains the familiar provision that no
injury shall be compensable if it is caused by the injured em-
ployee's wilful intention to injure another.69 In construing this
provision the court interpreted "wilful" to denote an element
of premeditation or deliberateness in attempting or intending
to injure another. Thus, where a blow is struck in a heated
quarrel, such blow is not sufficient to bar the striker thereof from
relief for an injury subsequently inflicted upon him.70 The court
mentioned the fact that the majority of the jurisdictions which
have donsidered this question have not barred relief on the basis
of the claimant having been the aggressor.7 1 That this is the
present situation of the law is evident from the above discussion.
Conclusion
This field of Workmen's Compensation law has been greatly
liberalized in recent years, as evidenced by this discussion. The
fact that the injured employee was technically the aggressor in
an assault, whether it arose out of the employment or was
personal only, was sufficient to bar any form of relief in the
early stages of development. The courts at first were paying
too much attention to the question of who struck the first blow.
The true test in all Workmen's Compensation cases is threefold:
(1) whether the injury arose out of the employment, (2)
whether the injury is one contemplated by the act, and (3)
whether the injury arose in the course of employment.72 In none
of the state statutes does the defense of "aggression" appear.
Why should the courts persist in reading the aggressor defense
into the statutes? It certainly seems reasonable that had the
framers of the acts intended compensation to be denied an
aggressor they would have included this defense among those
which are specifically enumerated in the acts. This is an
obvious instance in which the rule of statutory construction
known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius could be applied
logically.
Courts are prone to find that the victim of an assault can
recover compensation for his injuries where it is determined
68 Id. 58 N.W.2d at 736.
69 ARx. STAT. ANN., § 81-1305 (Supp. 1953).
,0 Johnson v. Safreed, 273 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1954).
71 Id. 273 S.W.2d at 547.




that the risk of such injuries was incidental to the employment.
This is saying no more than that the injuries arose out of and
in the course of employment. Why should a court hold that an
injury received by the victim of a work-connected assault is one
which has arisen out of the employment, and at the same time
hold that an injury received by the instigator of the same assault
is not an injury arising out of the employment? The distinction is
illogical, unreasonably harsh and not in conformity with the pur-
pose of the Workmen's Compensation legislation in general.
It is submitted that the modern trend of the cases is indicative
of a further departure by the courts from a reliance on the
strict principles of the common law when enforcing the acts.
It is to be hoped that the rest of the courts will soon fall in
line with this trend.
George N. Tompkins, Jr.
